In the Absence of Iranian Fighter Jets from the Confrontation Scene… Are They Being Held in Reserve for a Post-Regime Phase?
For observers monitoring since the outbreak of the exchange of strikes between Israel and Iran three days ago, the complete absence of Iranian fighter aircraft—such as the MiG-29, F-5, and Su-24—from the battlefield draws significant attention. Despite their relative aging, these aircraft remain capable of executing combat missions against internal or regional adversaries. This absence raises legitimate questions about the underlying reasons: Are these aircraft truly unfit for use? Or is the regime deliberately keeping them out of the current conflict for reasons beyond the immediate confrontation?
An even more intriguing aspect is Israel’s stance, which has yet to target these aircraft—either on the ground during their transit or at airbases—despite its known focus on neutralizing any aerial threats, even potential ones. From the perspective of non-Persian populations within Iran—such as Arabs Ahwazi, Kurds, and Baloch—the continued operation or intact status of fighter jets like the MiG-29 and F-5 within airbases poses a persistent threat. Any alternative regime, if not democratic and genuinely representative of diverse nationalities, might utilize this air power again to suppress aspirations for self-determination or to curtail cultural and political rights of these groups.
This situation is not disconnected from Iran’s historical record of deploying military force, not only against external enemies but also against internal components at the first sign of demands for rights. Iran’s air force has historically used fighters and attack aircraft—such as the MiG series, F-14 Tomcat, and Su-25—to bomb Kurdish villages, suppress Ahwazian uprisings, or carry out Baloch campaigns. From this perspective, any “true will” to change the regime—if such exists—must include a clear strategy to neutralize these military assets, especially the fighter jets and attack aircraft. Leaving them intact without destruction or disabling would pose a serious risk—not only in re-establishing the oppressive regime in a new form but also in enabling it to rearm and organize systematic violence against internal populations.
Another possibility that cannot be ruled out is that Iran has transferred some of its aircraft—such as fighter jets and attack planes—to safer territories in neighboring countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, or even Pakistan—especially given its complex security relations with these states. If this is the case, discussions about a “theater of confrontation inside Iran” become even more complex, underscoring a plan to secure critical military assets for the next phase—regardless of whether the regime remains or falls.
In summary, neglecting the fate of the Iranian Air Force—including fighters like the MiG-29, F-5, Su-24, and attack aircraft—in any regime change scenario could be a catastrophic strategic mistake. Iran’s problem has never been solely its leadership but also the violent infrastructure of its central state—one that has consistently used its aircraft and air power to bombard Kurdish villages, suppress Ahwazian uprisings, or carry out Baloch campaigns. Unless this infrastructure is dismantled and its tools of repression neutralized, any transfer of power will remain suspicious and vulnerable to the re-emergence of violence in new guises.
Rahim Hamid, Ahwazi journalist
